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This study assessed the inaccuracy of the traffic estimates for toll motorway concessions in Spain. It was found that
the estimates conducted by both the government and the concessionaire showed a significant bias towards
overestimating traffic. The level of overestimation in Spain is even greater than that reported by other studies based
on worldwide data. The notorious levels of overestimation entail severe burdens to the economics of the
concessionaires that often prompt renegotiations of the contracts, which are often accepted by the government.
These renegotiations usually end up with toll changes or extension of the concession terms, which have to be
ultimately borne by future motorway users. It is postulated herein that the bias towards overestimating traffic in toll
motorways in Spain is mostly caused by strategic issues rather than by modelling errors.
1. Introduction
Many governments are implementing new ways to encourage
private participation in constructing, financing, and operating
transport infrastructure. Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are
mostly implemented to circumvent budgetary constraints, and
encourage efficiency and quality in the provision of public
infrastructure (OECD, 2008). The latter objective is achieved
through the integration of the life cycle of the project including
the design, construction, financing and operation phases.
One of the most common ways to boost private participation in
infrastructure projects is through the concession system, which
consists basically of transferring construction, maintenance, and
operation of the infrastructure to a private consortium, in
exchange for which that consortium receives the right to charge a
user fee, for a period of time, fixed or variable, as contractually
agreed upon in advance (Vassallo, 2004). Concession contracts
have a long tradition in some countries, such as the United
Kingdom (Debande, 2005), Spain (Izquierdo and Vassallo, 2004),
France (Fayard and Bousquet, 1998), Chile (Go´mez-Lobo and
Hinojosa, 2000) and Mexico (Guasch et al., 2003). Presently, the
United States is testing the concession contract model to manage
transport infrastructure and monetise valuable transport assets
(Foote, 2006).
Concession contracts have to deal with many risks, such as
construction, land acquisition, maintenance and operation, legal,
political and so on (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Traffic risk transpired
to be one of the most important risks as well as most difficult to
manage. Although road traffic inaccuracy has been analysed in
several studies (Bain, 2009; Bain and Plantagie, 2004; Bain and
Polakovic, 2005; Flyvbjerg et al., 2005), these studies put
together in the same sample different kind of roads and motor-
ways placed in different countries, which are granted and
regulated under very different approaches.
The aims of this study were threefold: first, to characterise the
level of accuracy of actual traffic compared to the initial
estimates made by both the government and the concessionaire
for toll motorway concessions in Spain; second, to attempt to
explain the reasons that might explain such deviations and the
significant bias towards overestimation; and finally, to identify the
consequences that the deviations may have for social welfare.
In Section 2 the research published to date is assessed regarding
the accuracy of traffic estimates, specifically for toll roads, and
the different causes of errors are explained. In Section 3 an
overview of the main characteristics of concession contracts in
Spain is given. In Section 4 a detailed analysis of the inaccuracy
of the traffic estimates for toll motorways in Spain is conducted,
and the reasons for this inaccuracy and its repercussions for
social welfare are evaluated. Section 5 includes the final conclu-
sions of the research.
2. Accuracy of traffic estimates for toll
roads: research to date
2.1 Studies conducted up to the present
The empirical results to date have demonstrated how forecasting
traffic in toll roads shows a consistent bias towards overestima-
tion. A study conducted in 2005 by Standard & Poor’s (S&P),
whose aggregated results are summarised by Bain (2009),
assessed the accuracy of traffic forecasts using a worldwide
database including over 100 toll roads. The forecasts used in this
study to compare real with predicted traffic are those embedded
in the models used at the financial close so these forecasts have
been approved by the banks.
This study revealed that on average forecasters overestimate first-
year traffic by 23%. Beyond the first year, it showed that
optimism bias and error measurement statistics remained constant
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through years 2 to 5 (Bain and Polakovic, 2005). Moreover, traffic
forecast errors for toll motorways seemed to be consistently in a
range between 0.20 and 0.30 in terms of standard deviation. The
study also showed that the overestimation level seems to be
greater in jurisdictions with a short history of toll roads than in
those with a long history.
Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) carried out a large study comparing real
traffic with forecasts for 214 road projects in 14 countries – most
of which were free roads. Unlike the S&P study, this study
showed almost no overestimation bias, even though they reported
forecasting errors (standard deviation ¼ 0.44) even greater than
the S&P study. The difference between these two studies may be
based on the different nature of the roads. The study by Flyvbjerg
et al. (2005) focused mainly on free roads on which traffic
estimations were mostly conducted by the public sector. However,
the study by Standard & Poor’s (Bain and Polakovic, 2005)
focused its sample on motorway concessions where bidders
calculate their own estimates.
A comparison between the two studies mentioned above shows
that the average overestimation bias varied substantially between
estimates conducted by the government for free roads, where no
average overestimation was reported, and estimates conducted by
the private sector for toll roads, where a significant level of
overestimation was noted.
2.2 Reasons for the errors in the estimates
Two different kinds of errors can be identified in the traffic
estimates (Vassallo and Baeza, 2007): ‘forecasting errors’ and
‘strategic errors’. Forecasting errors show the inability of the
forecaster to exactly predict the future traffic because of the
imperfection of the models or the uncertainty of the endogenous
variables. Strategic errors, however, show the bias intentionally
introduced by the forecaster in order to have a greater chance of
reaching its objectives.
De Jong et al. (2007) conducted an interesting study aimed at
determining the reasons for ‘forecasting errors’ in traffic esti-
mates. They claim that these errors are caused by input uncer-
tainty and model uncertainty. Input uncertainty refers to the
difficulty of accurately knowing the value of the inputs that
determine traffic forecasts. From an analysis conducted in a case
study in the Netherlands, they concluded that the contribution of
input uncertainty to the bulk of the ‘forecasting errors’ was
generally much larger than that of model uncertainty.
Strategic errors mostly depend on the incentives that the stake-
holder in charge of the forecasts has to reach its goals. The
literature shows several reasons which might explain strategic
errors. One of the reasons is the so-called winner’s curse (Capen
et al., 2001), which means that the bidders tend to make
overoptimistic offers to win the concession contract at all costs.
The winner’s curse effect is accentuated in institutional frame-
works in which renegotiation is easier (Athias and Nun˜ez, 2008).
Consequently, it seems that the willingness to renegotiate by the
government is crucial for the bidders in their decision to commit
strategic errors.
The public authorities in charge of the project might also have
incentives to inflate their traffic forecasts for several reasons: for
instance, to justify the construction of a project whose feasibility
is actually doubtful from a social point of view (usually called
‘white elephant’); or to convince the Treasury Department that no
public contributions are necessary to make the project financially
viable for the private sector.
3. Motorway concessions in Spain: an
overview
3.1 Brief history
Spain has considerable experience in the implementation of toll
motorway concessions. Since 1967, the Spanish central govern-
ment has granted 31 motorway concessions. In 2008, a total of
2700 km had been awarded, and 2450 km of that total were
already in operation.
There are three different periods in the history of toll motorway
concessions in Spain (Vassallo and Sa´nchez, 2007): from 1967 to
1975, from 1976 to 1995, and from 1996 until 2007. From 1967
to 1975, 15 motorway stretches were awarded, which account for
almost 50% of the concessions granted in Spain up to 2007. The
first set of toll motorway concessions were awarded through
specific legislation approved by the government for each conces-
sion. The toll motorway regulation became much more stable in
1972 when the Toll Motorway Concession Law (Ley 8/1972 de
Autopistas en Regimen de Concesio´n) was passed by the Spanish
Parliament.
The second period lasted from 1976 to 1995. During this period,
mostly with a government under the Socialist Party, infrastructure
funding policy in Spain changed radically. Instead of toll motor-
ways, the government opted for modernising the Spanish road
network by widening and upgrading the most important roads,
turning them into double-track fast lanes free of charge (called
autovı´as in Spanish) with quality standards below those for toll
motorways.
The third period began in 1996 and continued to 2007. In 1996,
the conservative Popular Party took office in Spain and the need
to contain Spain’s public deficit was the most difficult challenge
facing the new government. This was the main reason why the
new government decided to implement once again the policy of
offering concessions so as to encourage the participation of the
private sector in the financing of new transportation infrastruc-
ture. From 1996 to 2007, 16 toll highways concessions – 15 of
them were already in operation – have been awarded by the
central government of Spain through this approach, making a
total of 1003 km. This new trend towards private funding was
reinforced by a new Public Works Concession Law, passed in
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2003, which extended and updated the old Toll Motorway
Concession Law passed in 1972.
3.2 Main features of concession contracts in Spain
Even though there are some differences between the concessions
awarded in the first period (1967–1975) and the concessions
awarded in the third period (1996–2007), toll motorway conces-
sions in Spain have had the same distinctive features over the
years. Toll motorway concessions in Spain are always greenfield
projects, which means that the motorways are always new; or, in
other words, not built over the alignment of a previously existing
road. The most important risks of the concession (land acquisi-
tion, construction, operation and traffic demand) are allocated to
the concessionaire.
Central government is required to conduct a feasibility study to
decide whether the project is suitable to be financed and operated
through a concession contract or not. The feasibility study
requires the government to carry out traffic forecasts to assess the
feasibility of the concession. This feasibility study is crucial to
determine whether the concession would require public subsidies
to be viable. The traffic estimates necessary for this study are
conducted by the Planning Department of the Secretary of Public
Works. Once the government has decided to undertake the project
through a concession, the traffic forecasts conducted by the
government are submitted to the bidders, although the bidders
have total freedom to include their own estimates in their bids.
Unlike other long-term infrastructure contracts in the world (e.g.
design–build–finance–operate (DBFO) contracts in the UK or
Portugal), toll concession contracts in Spain are awarded on the
basis of the ‘open procedure’, instead of the ‘negotiated proce-
dure’. The ‘open procedure’ is based on granting the concession
to the best offer in terms of a set of criteria predefined by the
government in the bidding terms. Before the tender takes place,
the government writes a standard contract, which will determine
the future relationship with the eventual concessionaire (Sa´nchez
and Gago, 2010).
Toll caps are established in toll concession contracts in Spain for
every kind of vehicle. According to the contract, the tolls are
updated every year in line with inflation. In the year 2000, a
provision was introduced in order to allow slight modifications of
the tolls rates if traffic became lower or higher than expected.
The influence of this provision in the toll levels and consequently
on the traffic levels is however negligible (Bel and Fagueda,
2005).
4. Case study of toll motorway concessions
in Spain
The purpose of this section is to analyse the degree of inaccuracy
of the traffic estimates conducted for toll motorway concessions
awarded by the central government of Spain during the first 5
years of operation, which is usually called ‘ramp-up period’.
4.1 Methodology for the analysis of the inaccuracy of
traffic estimates in Spain
The methodology used in this research was based on comparing
the actual traffic with the traffic estimates for toll motorway
concessions in Spain. To that end, an indicator is defined that is
called the ‘annual traffic deviation’ (see Equation 1). This
indicator shows the inaccuracy of the estimates, whether over or
under, of actual traffic in year t compared to the forecasted traffic
in year t. This indicator is calculated according to Equation 1.
AD
j
t ¼
RY
j
t  FY jt
FY
j
t
3 100 ¼ RY
j
t
FY
j
t
 1
 !
3 100
1:
where AD
j
t is the annual traffic deviation for year t and
concession j; RY
j
t is the real traffic (annual average daily traffic
in year t for concession j); FY
j
t is the forecasted traffic (annual
average daily traffic in year t for concession j).
If AD
j
t . 0, traffic predictions were underestimated whereas if
AD
j
t , 0, traffic predictions were overestimated. In the present
research, this indicator was calculated for the estimates provided
by the concessionaire in the tender and the estimates conducted
by the central government in the original feasibility study.
4.2 Data
The present database included only the concessions awarded
during the third period, from 1996 to 2007. The concessions
awarded in the first period (from 1967 to 1975) were not analysed
because only a few estimates were available for those toll
concessions and they were awarded under a different legislation
and socio-economic framework. The toll motorway concessions
included in the present database have similar characteristics: all
of them are greenfield projects, all of them are located in Spain,
all of them are regulated by the same legislation, and all of them
were awarded in recent years. The main difference across the
concessions is related to the availability of transport alternatives
since some concessions compete with free motorways whereas
others compete with free roads or toll motorways. The gross
domestic product (GDP) and the consumer price index (CPI)
growth in Spain remained quite stable over the period of analysis,
with the exception of the year 2008 in which the economic crisis
prompted a substantial change in their development (see Table 1).
The annual average daily traffic (AADT) for each concession was
obtained from the databases that are published every year by the
Secretary of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) of the
government of Spain. The last issue of this publication includes
data up to 2008.
Obtaining the information of the estimates by the central govern-
ment and the concessionaire was quite a challenge as this
information is not public in Spain. The information regarding the
government’s estimates was made available by the Planning
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Department of the Secretary of Public Works. The estimates of
the concessionaire, which are included in the financial plans
submitted by the bidders in the tender, were provided by the
Concession Unit of the Secretary of Public Works.
4.3 Results
Before implementing the methodology outlined earlier, it seems
interesting to take a look at the evolution of traffic growth over
the period of analysis, in comparison with the evolution of some
macroeconomic indicators. To this end the annual traffic growth
is compared with the annual GDP growth in real terms and the
CPI indexes in Table 1. From the analysis of Table 1, two aspects
are of note. First, the traffic growth from the first to the second
year of operation was very large for most of the concessions (see
the shaded cells in the Table 1); and second, traffic growth seems
to be extremely sensitive to GDP growth. In other words, for
most of the concessions, traffic grows more than the GDP in real
terms when the economy is doing well. However, traffic decreases
more than the GDP when the economy is doing poorly (note this
effect in last column of the table).
Table 2 shows a summary of the traffic deviations (AD
j
t) of the
concessionaires’ estimates, measured according to Equation 1,
during the first 5 years of operation. For some concessions a track
record of 5 years of operation is not available because those
concessions started their operation phase recently. In spite of this,
they have been included in the database to consider all the toll
motorways in operation within the period of analysis in order to
have a more complete sample. The table shows several trends
related to the behaviour of the traffic deviations.
(a) Traffic levels were substantially overestimated by all the
concessionaires during the years analysed. The only exception
was the Ma´laga–Estepona–Guadiaro motorway where traffic
predictions underestimated traffic for years 4 and 5. The
average overestimation for the first 2 years of operation was
particularly high.
(b) On average, the accuracy of the estimates improved over
time. The average overestimation for those concessions with
a track record of 5 years (concessions 1 to 10) progressively
improved from 43.6% in year 1 to 27.4% in year 5.
(c) The trend described above changed in 2008 because of a
severe recession (see the shaded cells in Table 2). For this
year, the traffic estimates prove to be less accurate than the
year before. The only exceptions to this rule are the
motorways that in 2008 were in the first year of the ramp-up
period (Cartagena–Vera and Circunvalacio´n de Alicante).
(d ) The toll motorways that compete directly with a free
motorway (those rows printed in bold and italics in Table 2)
show in general higher overestimation levels than the toll
motorways that have other types of competition.
(e) Regarding the standard deviation of AD
j
t , it was found that in
general this tended to increase over the years. This means
that, even though the further into the future the year under
discussion, the better on average is the initial prediction,
Toll highway concessions First year
of
Annual growth: %
operation 1999
–00
2000
–01
2001
–02
2002
–03
2003
–04
2004
–05
2005
–06
2006
–07
2007
–08
Annual GDP growth in real terms 5.13 4.25 3.48 4.27 4.27 4.55 4.64 4.09 0.67
Annual CPI growth 3.40 3.60 3.50 3.00 3.00 3.40 3.50 2.80 4.10
Ma´laga–Estepona–Guadiaro 1999 36.93 19.77 16.21 18.86 8.00 6.71 4.27 3.39 8.61
Alicante–Cartagena 2001 9.09 21.00 12.51 5.78 4.24 3.56 9.74
A´vila–Villacastı´n 2002 16.28 11.67 2.37 4.17 12.24 0.67
Santiago–Alto de Santo Domingo 2003 20.89 1.81 8.66 13.45 3.65
Segovia–El Espinar 2003 0.77 5.16 10.55 11.42 3.42
Leo´n–Astorga 2003 12.24 5.17 8.29 19.98 4.37
R-2 Madrid Guadalajara 2003 23.53 24.08 23.89 16.15 3.99
R-3 Madrid Arganda 2004 28.51 19.53 0.58 6.39
R-5 Madrid Navalcarnero 2004 15.88 28.84 16.22 4.68
R-4 Madrid Ocan˜a 2004 5.62 36.09 23.79 8.52
Eje aeropuerto 2005 73.33 15.75 6.64
Ocan˜a–La Roda 2006 9.94 3.32
Madrid–Toledo 2006 59.10 13.32
Cartagena–Vera 2007 8.37
Circunvalacio´n de Alicante 2007 18.55
Table 1. Real traffic growth in toll highway concessions included
in the sample
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whereas the further the year, the more different is the
behaviour of the concessions in the sample.
In Table 3 the results obtained in the present study are compared
with the results obtained by Bain (2009), who conducted a similar
study using a worldwide database of toll road projects. The main
differences between the two studies are listed here.
(a) The overestimation level in Spain is higher than the
worldwide results obtained by Bain (Bel and Fagueda, 2005).
One of the reasons for this difference could be that Bain’s
estimations are those approved by the banks at the financial
close of the projects whereas the estimations that have been
incorporated in the present research are those of the
concessionaires at the tender stage. Unlike the general
practice in many countries, in Spain the financial close
always takes place after the contracts are awarded.
(b) The estimates’ accuracy in Bain’s study remained similar over
the years whereas the results for Spain show a better accuracy
over time. This may be caused by the fact that all the toll
motorway concessions in Spain are greenfield projects,
whereas not all the projects in Bain’s database are necessarily
greenfield. Moreover, all the toll motorways in Spain have at
least a road alternative whereas this is not common in some
toll roads programmes around the world (for instance in Latin
American concessions).
(c) The standard deviation of the traffic deviations in the
database used for the present study is lower than in Bain’s
database. This might be caused by the fact that the sample in
Spain is quite homogeneous – projects with similar
characteristics and the same legislation – whereas in Bain’s
worldwide database, projects are rather heterogeneous.
After comparing the present results with Bain’s, the focus of the
study moved on to consider the determining statistical signifi-
cance of the two major trends that were observed in this research:
(a) a bias towards overestimating traffic, and (b) the fact that
concessions that have free parallel motorways competing with
them show less accurate predictions. In order to evaluate the
statistical significance of those trends, five regressions were
calibrated – one for each year – according to Equation 2.
AD
j
t ¼ Æ t þ  t  X j þ  jt
with t ¼ 1 to 5
X j ¼ 1 if concession j competes with a
free motorway
X j ¼ 0 otherwise2:
where X j is the categorical variable reflecting the kind of
competition for concession j; Æ t is the independent parameter of
the regression for year t;  t is the parameter of the categorical
variable Xj for the regression of year t;  jt is the error for
observation j in the regression calibrated for year t.
The results of the regression are displayed in Table 4. All the
regressions are significant at the 95% level of confidence since
the probability of the F-statistic is always , 0.05 (see last column
of Table 4). Likewise, all the parameters of the calibrated
regressions, with the only exception of Æ5, are significant at the
95% level of confidence since the probability of the t-statistic
is , 0.05. Consequently, the results of the regression demonstrate
that: (a) there is a significant bias towards overestimating traffic;
and (b) the fact that the toll highway competes with a free
motorway has significant influence in the level of overestimation.
Moreover, looking at the Æ t and  t parameters across the differ-
ent years, it can be seen that while the Æ t parameter diminishes
over the years from 40.2 to 14.3%, the  t parameters remain
more or less around 25%. This means that the errors on the
estimates corresponding to the first years of operation improve
over the years whereas the errors on the estimates caused by the
existence of a parallel motorway remain very much the same over
the years.
Finally, a comparison was conducted between the inaccuracy of
the concessionaires’ estimates and the inaccuracy of the estimates
conducted by central government. It should be noted that central
government conducts its estimates within the framework of a
feasibility study to determine whether the project is viable or not.
Years from opening Mean Standard deviation
Bain’s study Spain study Bain’s study Spain study
Year 1 0.23 0.44 0.26 0.14
Year 2 0.22 0.40 0.23 0.14
Year 3 0.21 0.35 0.22 0.15
Year 4 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.18
Year 5 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.22
Table 3. Comparison of the results with those obtained by Bain
(2009)
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Once the tender is open, the government makes these estimates
available to the bidders who also have total freedom to conduct
their own estimates.
Unfortunately, the government was only able to make available
the estimates for 10 out of the 15 concessions that were analysed
in this research. This information, however, was enough to enable
the comparison between the government’s and the concessio-
naires’ estimates to be carried out. Table 5 summarises the
results.
The main result from Table 5 is that the estimates conducted by
the government are not much more accurate than those of the
concessionaires. On the one hand, the government overestimates
traffic for almost all the concessions and years analysed. On the
other hand, with few exceptions (such as the Cartagena–Vera and
Leo´n Astorga highways) the estimates conducted by the govern-
ment are quite similar to those of the concessionaires. For some
concessions, the estimates by the central government are even
slightly more optimistic than those of the concessionaires (see the
cells shaded in Table 5). In spite of that, on average, the estimates
by the central government are between 6.32 and 11.26% more
accurate than those of the concessionaires (see the mean differ-
ences row on the bottom of Table 5).
4.4 Consequences of traffic overestimation on social
welfare
Baeza (2008) shows that, unlike traffic, capital and operation
costs are not substantially overestimated by toll motorway
concessionaires in Spain. In addition, the financial terms of the
loans have remained fairly stable over the period of analysis.
Apart from traffic, the only cost item that has experienced
substantial overestimation in some of the concession contracts is
the land acquisition cost. As the financial balance of a conces-
sion contract depends substantially on the items referred to
above, it is clear that traffic overestimation has played a crucial
role in the financial problems of toll highway concessions in
Spain.
As a consequence of that, the following question arises: how were
the concessionaires able to survive with such low traffic levels?
The answer to this question is that renegotiations of concession
contracts in Spain have been too common. The aim of the
renegotiations has mostly been to rebalance the economics of the
concession.
The historical record of renegotiations of toll highway conces-
sions in Spain is extensive. The concessions awarded between
1967 and 1975 have been renegotiated on average eight times
each. A total of 24% of these renegotiations have concluded with
extensions of the concessions duration beyond the original dura-
tion fixed by the contracts, and 50% of the renegotiations have
concluded with toll modifications. Two of the most important
concessions awarded during the first period (Tarragona–Valencia
and Valencia–Alicante) ultimately had a real traffic flow that
barely reached 50% of the predicted value throughout the life of
the contract. The concessions were able to survive because their
duration was almost doubled (Baeza, 2008).
The concessions awarded from 1996 to 2007 have scarcely been
renegotiated, mostly because the contracts are still fairly recent.
However, the concessionaires and the government were, at the
time of writing, on their way to reaching an agreement to
improve the poor financial performance of the concessions. In
fact, the public budget for year 2010 included provisions to
rebalance the economics of the concession contracts due to low
traffic and high land acquisition costs. Consequently, the renego-
tiation of the concession contracts awarded from 1996 onwards
seems to be already a matter of fact.
The consequences of these renegotiations are that, in the end,
future users have to bear the burden – through longer contracts or
higher tolls – caused by the poor traffic estimates conducted by
the government, which are made even poorer by the concessio-
naire. From the global welfare perspective, renegotiations seem
neutral at first glance since they entail a mere transfer of
resources from the users to the private concessionaires. However,
Linear regression Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Æt 0.402 0.378 0.304 0.203 0.143
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.051)
Free motorway (t) 0.256 0.215 0.253 0.267 0.326
(0.002) (0.006) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011)
Observations 15 15 13 11 10
R-squared 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.48 0.58
F 13.65 10.47 8.12 8.27 10.84
Significance F 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.011
p-values of the t statistic in parenthesis
Table 4. Calibration of the regression to calculate the influence
of competition from a free motorway
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the behaviour described above may prevent companies which are
not familiar with how things work in Spain from participating in
the tender, which reduces competition and, therefore, the ultimate
efficiency.
5. Conclusions
From the analysis conducted for this paper the following conclu-
sions are drawn.
(a) The traffic estimates for toll motorway concessions in Spain
show a significant bias towards overestimation. This bias is
even larger than the bias obtained by Bain (2009) for a
worldwide database. Even though the estimates conducted by
the government are slightly more accurate than those of the
concessionaires, the government still shows a consistent trend
towards overestimating traffic.
(b) For toll motorway concessions in Spain, the longer into the
future the year for which estimates were made, the better the
traffic predictions are; or, in other words, traffic predictions
seem to be less accurate for the first years of operation. This
fact may be caused by the difficulty in knowing the users’
behaviour when a greenfield toll motorway is opened.
(c) The existence of a competitive free motorway in the corridor
has a significant influence on the level of traffic
overestimation. The toll motorway concessions that have a
free motorway competing with them have overestimation
levels around 25% greater than the toll motorways which
have other kinds of competition (free road or toll motorway).
j Motorway Estimates Traffic deviations ADt
j : %
1 2 3 4 5
2 Alicante–Cartagena Government 23.56 22.70 13.90 7.92 2.84
Concessionaire 23.83 21.36 9.94 4.10 3.98
4 Santiago–Alto de Santo Domingo Government 38.13 27.38 28.21 24.27 16.60
Concessionaire 43.37 33.02 34.10 31.80 25.61
6 Leo´n–Astorga Government 4.71 12.83 12.80 9.97 3.20
Concessionaire 28.12 44.04 45.61 45.45 36.94
7 R-2 Madrid Guadalajara Government 50.86 41.64 32.00 20.90 13.74
Concessionaire 62.68 57.76 58.16 47.26 42.75
8 R-3 Madrid Arganda Government 56.59 47.65 41.04 43.95 50.25
Concessionaire 56.55 47.43 40.83 43.96 50.61
9 R-5 Madrid Navalcarnero Government 61.74 57.28 48.18 43.29 49.10
Concessionaire 58.49 55.49 46.94 42.94 49.68
10 R-4 Madrid Ocan˜a Government 58.80 58.42 46.39 37.58 46.27
Concessionaire 56.15 56.57 44.60 35.70 44.86
11 Eje aeropuerto Government 71.55 52.32 49.89 51.45 –
Concessionaire 78.59 64.51 60.73 64.95 –
12 Ocan˜a–La Roda Government 47.58 47.20 50.02 – –
Concessionaire 48.68 55.44 56.29 – –
14 Cartagena–Vera Government 46.72 48.06 – – –
Concessionaire 69.67 64.61 –
Mean motorways: 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, Government 45.08 41.55 – – –
12, 14 Concessionaire 52.61 50.02 – – –
Mean differences GC 7.53 8.48 – – –
Mean motorways: 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Government 40.71 38.27 31.79 26.84 25.08
Concessionaire 47.03 45.10 40.03 35.89 36.35
Mean differences GC 6.32 6.83 8.24 9.05 11.26
Standard deviation motorways: 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, Government 21.94 15.42 – – –
9, 10, 11, 12, 14 Concessionaire 17.19 13.90 – – –
Standard deviation motorways: 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, Government 24.11 17.68 14.50 15.07 22.93
9, 10 Concessionaire 15.60 13.64 15.11 15.07 16.62
Table 5. Comparison between the estimates of the central
government and the concessionaire
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(d ) The financial problems caused by a shortage of traffic have
been traditionally solved in Spain through future
renegotiations of the concession contracts that ended up with
extensions of the concession terms or tolls modifications.
On the basis of the conclusions listed above, it appears that, even
though correctly forecasting traffic is quite an issue for toll
motorways, the consistent and significant bias towards over-
estimating traffic in Spain seems to be explained by the strategic
behaviour of the government and the concessionaire rather than
by modelling errors.
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